Hegel Animals

This is a little bit of a step back but going back to around page 67. Hegel has a brief talk about animals  in relation to perception. "Even the animals are not shut out from this wisdom but,on the contrary show themselves to be most profoundly initiated into it; for they do not just stand idly in front of sensuous things as if these possessed intrinsic being, but despairing f their reality, and completely assured of their nothingness, they fall to without ceremony and eat them up. And all Nature, like the animals, celebrates these open mysteries which teach the truth about sensuous things"(65). I find this interesting that nearly every other philosopher we had read did not look at animals through this lens. He adopts a more studious approach to animals than them being the source of your decision for food or hunt. Humanizing this creature to create this bond of experience and perception.

11:11

The section of Force and the Understanding in which Hegel explains the inseparability of opposites in order to elucidate his distinction between Notion and law, makes sense. Namely, his explanation that sourness is oppositely contained within something that is sweet, just as either electromagnetic pole of Earth is inextricably connected to the other, and how what may be punished as a criminal act could serve a higher purpose either for the criminal in this world of appearance, or in the supersensible world—whether that be for himself or some aspect of that world—affords reason insofar as a unifying force may be assigned to such phenomena. For instance, that would consist of attractive electromagnetic substances, states of taste that will result from spoilage of a food that otherwise possesses an opposite taste in its ripe form, and how the process of civil law pertaining to punishment of crime comprises at least a roughly unified stream of a particular Force.

As an excellent exhibit of such opposition-centered Force based on inversion of its laws, such an utterance as “living on either side of the law” lends credence to how law functions in terms of Hegel's ontology, whereby the realm of criminal acts and the people who commit them are inextricably linked with those on the opposing side of so-called Law Enforcement, which is a system of individuals who cannot live as they do, or perhaps even have decent livelihoods, in the full-fledged absence of criminal activity. Conversely, criminals cannot receive a potential gain from punishment, or a process of trial whence they may be acquitted in a way translatable to personal growth, or some enhancement in a supersensible manner that might only be known by the self-consciousness of a punished, or eventually acquitted individual.

Ergo, the cumulative Notion of repellent polarities consisting of reward on one polar node (or the punishment-administering sector of the so-called justice system in a solicited sense) and the other node related to punishment received by a criminal on account of soliciting via their miscreant act(s), is paradoxically contingent on the cross-reliability of both sides of the system in order to generate a collective Force that literally requires opposite sides of the law. Also, such activity from a sociologically perspective is represented succinctly by the relationship concerning how the oxygen pole in the phenomena of electricity would equivocate, or be compressed into hydrogen in a state of “unmanifested electricity,” as Hegel puts it. This analogy as it relates to law in a psycho-social sense, and electromagnetism in a physical sense, aptly illustrates what is perhaps the most powerful phenomenon of reality in its totality: the diametric opposition of poles manifested conjointly as law, which is thereby manifested as the overall Notion comprising any and all activity occurring between the poles—that being Force.

Furthermore, the idea that law is attributed to the infinite replication of Forces contains legitimacy insofar as such laws happen to inexorably fall into place each and every time Forces manifest. Such Forces' instances can be repeated (or replicated, in Hegel's terms) to a theoretically infinite degree, so long as the necessary substrates are present in order for the complementary soliciting and solicited components of the law to actualize the overarching Notion of the Force associated with whatever substrates are taken into account. While this is cogent, Hegel seemingly fails to consider the potential impermanence of the multiplicity of substrates, which are indispensable in terms of facilitating the actualization of Forces that, in turn, would conceivably suffer utter dissolution without their essential substrates, whereupon revitalization of the Forces would fail to occur barring the reemergence of opposing substrates required to make such Forces exist. In light of this, it is arguably reasonable to conjecture that new Forces, or variations of preexisting Forces, could arise in accordance to the development of instances of altered, or altogether new substrates necessary for certain Forces to propagate.

In summation, supposing that dissolution of a theoretically infinite array of objects tantamount to utilization as substrates (and for a correspondingly infinite variety of forces) is viable, supreme existential intrigue is evoked upon the quandary regarding what underlying Force, unto which all other Forces are constituted, exists. An ultimate Force as such would not merely be infinite in a theoretical sense, but infinite in an absolute manner in accordance to the polarities necessitating law, which has always existed infinitely in a circular motion, or regressed to a point of singularity in which the poles split apart from an infinitesimally dense conglomeration and into a higher state of repulsion, thence leading to an array of activities capable of being performed within the primordial poles that in turn instantiated an infinite pool of objects susceptible to configuration into distinct Forces, with particular interest concerning the Forces relevant to the materially-dominated world of appearance that we seem capable of Understanding, or “knowing” so well by means of sense-perception.

Force as Movement

Understanding Hegel's explanation of force and the understanding requires one to consider the unity and movement between the excluding "One" and the "Also". Force is distinguished from "force proper", force being the movement from the One to the Also, and force proper the movement back from the Also to the One. We can see Hegel's universality in this division; force and force proper are identical as in they are both forces, but they are also completely opposite. For example, take the number series' 1,2,3,4,5 and 5,4,3,2,1. They are complete opposites of one another, yet they are also identical. The 4 is between the 5 and the 3, the 3 is between the 4 and the 2, and the 1 and 5 are on the extremes. This is one way that we can understand the unity of the excluding "One" and the "Also".

The Inverted World is the most mystical chapter in Hegel's phenomenology. and describes the a second "supersensible" world that contains the opposites of all objects, morals, propositions etc. The point of the paradoxical relationship between the sensory world and the supersensible is to illustrate that everything that appears has an inner appearance that does not manifest itself, i.e. salt is inwardly sweet, black, etc.

Hegel and Understanding

One aspect of Hegel that has particularly interested me has been his understanding of the manner in which human understanding is. His views take a more centered approach and contrast with other views such as Kant's view. In Kant, understanding is largely possible due to outside conditions, such as space and time. This is not the case with Hegel. Essentially, Hegel's understanding seems to be that we are the facilitators for understanding. He states that, "We are the universal medium in which such moments are kept apart and exist each on its own" (Hegel 72). Thus, our understanding interprets things in the manner in which we see ourselves. Humans are a collection of various body parts that interpret and act in varying ways. Thus, external things are understood by us within these separate terms and yet can be comprehended as a one due to our perceived unity as one body with many parts. The question arrived in class discussion as to why we strive for singularity, or unity of ourselves, against the outside world? Why when we walk is it so hard for us to understand the role the ground plays in our walking? The reason is within an element of how we see ourselves, as one. The most interesting component to this perceived unity is the fact that we are simply many various parts and yet we see ourselves as just the opposite. The one of the many. This view is then posited on the world around us and applied to our place, and our understanding, within it.

Things cannot be perceived without a boundary

In the Perception section of the A. Consciousness, Hegel illustrates some of the logical fallacies that when examined, help to illuminate the flaws of our method of perception, and the mental processes that follow, hence the title: Perception and the thing of Deception.  Hegel determines that the process of individualizing and defining certain characteristics or properties of a thing, begin with perception.  He makes the differentiation between perception and immediate sense certainty by stating that with sense certainty, one only comes in contact with the thingness in itself, without detail and only in presence.  In this regard negation is exclusive to perception, as one can only define what something is by having the fundamental understanding of what it is not.  This understanding creates the boundaries for, and subsequently the realm in which properties can be applied and recognized as independent from other things, these other things having boundaries and properties that define their thingness as well.  Similar to many things perceived, the state of the thing then becomes twofold, as it both acts as a preservation of certain properties and a negation of certain properties.  As it is defined by an object, such as a table is defined as separate from the floor because of the properties the boundaries of the floor contain, so to is the floor separate from table by the properties that the table contains.  Properties and therefore the items they entail, are considered the negatives of one another due to the universality of their nature.  Similar to how ‘here’ can be considered an idea of relativity dependent upon where the attention of the perceiver is being aimed, so to can the thing be defined by the properties that are being paid attention to.  The color Red is a property that can be contained within a thing; its redness can initially be known as a natural reaction, or sense certainty, inherent within man.  But prior to the conceptualization of red, it must have a counterpart, or a variable.  This variable ensures that red is not constant or enveloping all things.  Once it envelops all things through a constant nature, it is no longer a thing, as it has no boundaries, and no definition.

Perception

How does Hegel's description of perception differ from that of sense-certainty? While sense-certainty appears to us as immediate truth, or as "pure being", perception is the next step in the evolution of sense-certainty because it begins to make distinctions within a singular object. Perception can take an object and break it down into its parts or qualities. A tree, for example, is equally a tree as it is a combination of branches, leaves, bark, fibers, roots, etc, but it is neither an exclusionary "One", to use Hegel's terms, or merely a combination of parts. We are drawn back into Hegel's ideas about negation and universality with this presentation of perception. But what does Hegel mean when he claims, "the Thing is the Also, or the universal medium in which the many properties subsist apart from one another, without touching or cancelling one another..."? Using his example of a cube of salt, it appears to us as white, tart, and formed into a cube. Its whiteness is not dependent upon its tartness, which is in turn not dependent on it being a cube. All of the qualities of an object are indifferent to one another. We must say that the salt cube is white, also tart, and also a cube. It is not white, tart, or cube-shaped; it must be a particular combination of these qualities. Hegel claims that this is where something gets its thingness, from the various alsos that apply to it and only it.

Hegel and Doubt

In his introduction to the Phenomenology of Spirit,  Hegel details the distress that follows the realization that no truth can be perceived by an individual.  In this regard we have an inability to point to something, and detail it for what it truly is, but instead only the qualities it entails in our observation.  With this said, we realize that we cannot separate ourselves from our cognition, for as soon as we make an attempt to examine the manner in which we know, we are using a subjective instrument to do so.  I think this is what Hegel is explaining when he states that the separate entities that we claim responsible for different forms of knowing, i.e seeing, and thought being separate entities, are actually one large condition.  Any attempt to separate out and examine a certain aspect of our cognition would be futile as it takes the whole to examine it, as one always connects to and is affected by the other.

This seems to be the cause for Hegel to make an attempt to define aspects of our experience by what things are not.  If we have an inability to define something for what it truly is, perhaps we can make determinate negations to better understand the truer properties of our surroundings.  By claiming what things are not, when we are unable to claim what things are, we are engaging in some form of a productive activity, instead of falling into the negative consequences of doubt without end.

A Slice of Pi

What was derived from Hegel's Introduction to Phenomenology of Spirit is that consciousness undergoing experience in its highest form would lead to the functional equivalent of a godlike, superego-dominated perception of everything. Hegel emphasizes that the process in which humans proceed to perform and approach science is itself a science, and in light of what he classifies as a Science of Spirit, he asserts at the end of the Introduction with devastating punctuation and abruptness, albeit of a perfectly cohesive manner in conjunction with the preceding passages, that once humans come to fully comprehend, rather than merely apprehend, what comprises the meta-consciousness, or super-consciousness from which individualized instances (or semblances) of consciousness manifested in biologically dominated, viscerally warped humans are experienced, then the nature of absolute knowledge will finally be realized, and consciousness's ability to entirely understand consciousness will have reached fruition.

Rather than merely knowing objects insofar as they relate to existence for the sake of conscious understanding through the apparatus of sense-certainty, or how they exist in terms of appearance and utility, objects as they are in and of themselves—or the essence of each object in-itself—could alas be known. Humans would in turn possess what would ideally amount to omniscient intelligence (or complete and unadulterated perception pertaining to all objects as they are in themselves) in an ultimate state translatable to an understanding of the composite essences of all objects, and the indivisibly interconnected concatenation of the totality of all objects.

Furthermore, the essences of all objects could conceivably be regarded in terms of how they came together and attained their current sensible and physical compositions starting from not only the genesis consistent with the formation of each individual object in piecemeal fashion, but the creation of all physicality starting with the primordial origin of Creation.

As far as the operations, or functions and utilities resulting from physical construction are concerned, such actions could be ascertained in omniscient fashion beyond a shadow of a doubt. Having satisfied the criteria of omniscience on all counts, then all objects in addition to the ubiquitous substance or array of substances underlying the totality and ultimate quintessence of material reality can be known as it is in itself, wherefore the Notions of objects will have converged in a state of complete understanding with objects' objective utilities and material compositions, which make such processes possible, thereby enabling consciousness to get behind itself (as Hegel puts it), which is necessary in order to attain ideal purview (or an omniscient perspective) over all objects spanning reality, or the capacity to truly see objects as they are in themselves, as opposed to merely seeing how they are for the sake of sense-certainty's immediate perceptual convenience and application (viz., comprehension will have finally supplanted mere apprehension).

In summation, it's curious whether such supreme consciousness requires the dissolution of the body altogether, or if such experiences of the ultimate reality, if you will, can occur transiently while possessing a body. Well, it certainly appears as though that can happen while possessing a body such that absolute knowledge about how everything under the purview of experience is in-itself may be realized, as well as how any given object can be applied for various results, or combined with other compatible objects. It is notable that the entire system of consciousness is regarded by Hegel as the realm of absolute truth tantamount to absolute knowledge, while also considered the realm of true spirit. This naturally appears to be the terminal aim of the Science of Spirit's goal:  The ability to tap into and gain idealized enlightenment of the reality of objects by means of experiencing the entire system of consciousness. Supposing such access is attainable while possessing a brain that is so vulnerable to physiological vicissitudes amidst a prevailing notion that the spiritual consists of that which transcends human experience, and solely has to do with an incorporeal quintessence that cannot be grasped by means of corporeal mechanisms, then Hegel did an an exquisite job of shattering the dialectic barrier between a wholly separate realm of spirit beyond human comprehension, and the world of the overwhelmingly physical and human by defining the spirit as a concept commensurable with human existence insofar as the highest experience of the mind on par with consciousness in its ultimate form leads to incorporation with the realm of spirit: A realm not at all dependent on differentiated souls, a heavenly dimension, or spiritual entities possessive of this ineffable substance of spirit that allegedly eludes mortals on an absolute basis, or so it is claimed according to some furiously devout people who participate in various religious traditions. The idea that the spiritual—or the highest state of consciousness that humans can experience on account of the door that such an elevated consciousness opens to absolute knowledge—can be experienced without the need for religious devotion or dogmatic adherence to a set of supernatural beliefs based on ritual and concordant required actions (thus catalyzing the incorporation of spirituality into the domain of what may be considered traditional, or natural science), is beautifully revolutionary. This message consistent with shattering the polarizing, diametrical barrier between the spiritual world, and the sensible world dominated by the natural sciences—seeing as how this message is at least alluded to, if not made overtly clear by Hegel in the opening chapters of Phenomenology of Spirit—is one that the modern world be foolish to dismiss, or not pay diligent attention to on a level well beyond superficiality.

I Need to Get to the Future, NOW!

In reading Hegel's Sense Certainty I was struck by his ideas concerning the now. This topic is interesting in the sense that in recent years it seems to have become popular to speak about being present and living in the now.  While I don't necessarily disagree with this general sentiment, it does appear to have one essential flaw--the now is always escaping.  To quote Hegel, "'Now'; it has already ceased to be in the act of  pointing to it" (63).  At the same time that the now is that which negates everything, it is also the inescapable situation in which all things exist.
I very much appreciated Hegel's connection of this concept to the Eucharist on page 65 when he writes, "For he who is initiated into these Mysteries not only comes to doubt the being of sensuous thing, but to despair of it; in part he brings about the nothingness of such things himself in his dealings with them and in part he sees them reduce themselves to nothingness." In the case of the sacrament here, the finite nature of consuming consecrated bread and wine invokes the infinite. Partaking in the seeming destruction of what is eternal points to the eternal thing itself, that is, the universal.

Hegel is Phenomenal

Beginning to read Hegel after spending much time with Kant is an interesting transition to be sure. Kant in my mind perfectly laid out an argument for the existence of conditions of perception and flowing from these conditions a necessary "a priori" level of knowing. This was illustrated with the condition of "space". Without this "a priori" knowledge we would find it difficult (if not impossible) to examine or even comprehend objects external to us. Also, while we can think of empty space we cannot think of anything as empty of space. Kant goes on to lay out a large mapping of these conditions and how our perception and understanding operate through the use of them. Hegel, however, takes a different approach in regards to knowing and understanding. Hegel states that, "to be specific, it takes for granted certain ideas about cognition as and instrument and a medium and assumes that there is a difference between ourselves and this cognition." (47). Hegel believes that cognition (consciousness/understanding) is not formatted in the manner that Kant outlines. He thinks that there is no separation or difference between our understanding and ourselves. This is interesting in that this idea seems to counter the abstract manner with which Kant explains understanding and seems to place many of its ideas outside of us. Hegel believes that it is natural but false to assume a separation between the cognition and the object of the understanding.

Method of Philosophy

            Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit posses many great questions and uses an unconventional method to find answers to these. Using the English translation of Science gives me a warped view of his method. To me science would be more structured, like Hobbes or Kant. After reading the Introduction and Sense-Certainty, I see no discernable pattern of scientific method. But after learning that the German word Hegel uses better translate to Philosophy, his method makes much more sense. He is not giving us a clearly written formula, as I would imagine a scientist would. He is going through words and phrases that we usually say without knowing what we truly mean and dissecting the words. Words such as Now and This, that we so frequently use, have so much more meaning than we know we are using. By saying “this” pen or paper or book, we simultaneously are saying the thing is not everything else. Even though we think we are being specific with are giving of this or now, we never can mean what we truly want to say. We try to use these words to describe specific events, or particulars, but since these words are not particular words, in the sense that they only describe a single thing, we never can fully mean what we say.

            When I look at the example of night and day, his method of philosophy is clearer. It reminds me of Socrates’ dissection of words in Euthyphro or Hobbes’ meticulous defining of every term in Leviathan. In a sense, Science fits his method of philosophy, bit it takes a more in depth look into his work to find it.

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Sense - (Un)Certainty

Hegel has made an incredible argument in the sense-certainty chapter of the Phenomenology of Spirit. He has challenged the immediacy of what we perceive as inherently immediate, concluding that everything is mediated by the synthesis of subject and object. Without subjects, objects would have no place in reality, and vice versa. The co-dependence between subject and object makes immediacy impossible.

We spent a fair amount of time in class discussing the importance of seeing how everything is positive and negative at the same time, and how this plays into our understanding of particular and universal truths. Hegel uses the example of "Now that is Night" to illustrate this idea, an example that has its flaws, but allows us to see his point. Let us uncover a few important points behind this example. The object Now is either Night or Day, without failure; there is no other option on the continuum of Night/Day. Surely Now is Night at one moment while it equally is Day during another. When Now is Night, it is not Day, and when Now is Day, it is not Night. All of these points result in the conclusion that Now is neither Day nor Night, is both Day and Night, and is not-Day and not-Night. This can be called a universal because we reach these conclusions through negation. As Hegel says at the end of 96, "It is thus the universal that is, in fact, the truth of sense-certainty."

What's more is our language does not allow us to speak of particulars in the way that we think we can. We can never say the particular that we mean to say. If I were to ask you what time it was, you could give me an answer that satisfies my curiosity, but by saying "It is one o'clock", you have committed an error. It may be close to one o'clock, but it is impossible to point to "one o'clock" because as soon as you begin to, it is gone. Additionally, any positive affirmation is also a negation. By saying it is one o'clock, you are also saying that it is not any of the other possible times.

Hegel and Words

I found Hegel’s discussion of language in “Sense-Certainty” very interesting. He says: “But language, as we see, is the more truthful; in it, we ourselves directly refute what we mean to say, and since the universal is the true (content) of sense-certainty, and language expresses this true (content) alone, it is just not possible for us ever to say, or express in words, a sensuous being that we mean” (60). As someone who loves words and language, I thought this interpretation of them was a little disheartening. We will never mean what we really want to mean when we say something. It seems impossible to Hegel to signify something that actually exists in rather abstract combinations of syllables that signify words, which, in turn, signify something probably less specific than we meant.

Then, I thought about proper names for people and places. In these cases, I feel like I couldn’t be referring to anything other than what I am actually referring to. For example, “Nashville” cannot be referring to anything other than this chunk of land set by boundaries and given this specific name. Sure, what lies within the boundaries is constantly changing, but the essence of “Nashville” as a place is unmistakable. The same goes for people’s names. While there are other people named Katie, there are no other people (at least as far as I know) named Katherine Marie Johantges. That word signifies specifically me. People would mean me when they say it, and nothing else.

So, I think what we discussed in class holds to be true: that words can be considered universals, and proper names can potentially be thought of as particulars.

Bondsman and Lords

In chapter 4, Hegal changes the subject from consciousness to self-consciousness. Though they are both similar, Hegal sees self-consciousness as the awareness of one's self, a subject, rather than the awareness of an object. Hegal explains this in a vague and confusing manner, but uses a bondsman and a lord as an example. This is what I interpreted from the reading. The bondsman, or servant, is dependent on the lord for a living. He does everything for the lord and without being his servant he wouldn't be anything. Therefore, since he can not see himself as a person in a living society, and as an object, he does not have self awareness, or in other words, self-consciousness. Since the lord knows that he is a subject and not an object, he is aware of himself and therefore has self-consciousness.

Kant's Island

This example that we created in class. If you dont remember, is the circle explaining possible experience.We painted this illustrious picture depicting the circle within it being possible phenomena and emperically possible, over all things that can be known stay inside the circle of possible experience. While on the outside remains the understanding categories and Hume's causality. He explains his island in the book in the beginning of chapter III, Transcendental Doctrine of Judgement, "This domain is an island, enclosed by nature itself within unalterable limits. It is the land of truth-enchanting name!-surrounded by a wide and stormy ocean, the native home of illusion, where many a fog bank and many a swiftly melting iceberg give the deceptive appearance of farther shores, deluding the adventuurous seafarer ever anew with empty hopes, and engaging him in enterprises which he can never abandon et is unable to carry to completion"(257).

Hegel and the Introduction

            Hegel’s Phenomenology of Spirit begins with an Introduction on the faculty of knowledge and determining the Absolute. While the introduction provides detailed info on the content of his text, it also gives the reader with an indication of what his writing style is like. In one passage, Hegel writes, “Now, if we inquire into the truth of knowledge, it seems that we are asking what knowledge is in itself. Yet in this inquiry knowledge is our object, something that exists for us; and the in-itself that would supposedly result from it would rather be the being of knowledge for us. What we asserted to be its essence would be not so much its truth but rather just our knowledge of it. The essence or criterion would lie within ourselves, and that which was to be compared with it and about which a decision would be reached through this comparison would not necessarily have to recognize the validity of such a standard.” 

            Hegel’s thoughts on what in-itself is seems to be a very interesting topic that he will develop throughout his text. His writing style also interests me through his word choice. Overall, his introduction proves to be a thought-provoking preview for the rest of his writing.

Buddhist Ideals of the Self and Kant

While reading Kant I couldn't help but think of the Buddhist teaching of no-self, and how these two seemingly different teachings might compare.

Kant claims that an a priori foundation for experience is necessary for an experience to occur. This being said, the world can be seen as some form of a blur, the term form being used loosely, that does not organize itself until it comes across the perceptive qualities of the mind.  He also subcategorizes the a priori foundations for experience as space and time, and a natural setting of the mind that seems to be described as a form of intuition.The idea that there are fundamentals of an individual do not necessarily contradict the ideas of most Buddhist teachings in regards to the self, but it does offer a sense of identity in the form of necessary precursors to experience and therefore a priori to expression and behavior.

Buddha taught that the self is a by-product of thoughts that arise from 'Skandhas,' these include the main means by which we form ideas and concepts of our surroundings.  In addition, these 'Shandhas' are not possessed by the individual who experiences them, and therefore cannot identify with the precursors of experience.

It seems that by acknowledging precursors for experience, buddhist teachings and Kantian ideas work nicely together.  They both defy the existential idea that all humans are blank slates that are mere products of posteriori impressions, by implementing the idea that there are necessary fundamentals that all individuals contain that allows them to process their surroundings.

No Wonder Kant Died a Virgin

The conception of noumena as presented by Kant ultimately emphasizes a positive function insofar as the extension of thinking beyond merely consideration of what objective purposes apparent, sensible objects possess, enables humans to envision potential objects (better yet, phenomena) that could exist outside of currently recognized phenomena. This delimiting feature of noumena essentially allows for people to navigate the scope of their imaginations, and perhaps in a theoretically unlimited fashion, to the extent that they can imagine inventions or new objects, especially technology or phenomena that have yet to be discovered on account of man's geographical and subterranean lack of exploration, as well as deficiencies regarding instruments of science. Employing certain objects or inventions of the noumena, which only appeared in the mind and outside of external and sensible phenomena beforehand, can certainly possess a nature tantamount to utility, or actual existence that would therefore attain inclusion in a category, or recognition as a phenomenon proven a priori in synthetic fashion.
It moreover makes sense how attempting to conceive what objects are in themselves can serve a significant role in terms of judging how much of something can be known pertaining to what it is like in itself, or how new devices or approaches can be applied singly or together as a means to discover the essential properties of objects to varying degrees of dissection, and perhaps infinitesimally small degrees in some cases. Speaking of infinitesimally diminutive dissections, there is certainly an eventual terminal point at which the operations, utilities, as well as physical and perhaps subatomic properties of objects of sensible experience (or objects that become incorporated into the sensible realm) can be broken down prior to dissolution. In that case, a literal limiting apparatus of calculation and profoundly miniaturized visualization consistent with the noumena could be extremely helpful as far as determining or realizing essential limits are concerned.
By declaring the noumena to be the realm of pure intellect and thought devoid of corresponding physical objects (at least upon initial reflection), utilizing the practical component of imagination and hypothesizing--which could plausibly appear as premonitory or rigorously arrived-at intuitions--amounting to an arguably unmitigated capacity to explore the possibilities of dissection, potential functions, and technology that could be applied to such dissection and understanding of objects as they are in themselves, could serve a practical and significant purpose in light of the capability for synthetic a priori knowledge to appear in the pure intellect of the noumena prior to incorporation of such knowledge into a category of sensible phenomena. On the other hand, if experiences of the human mind were merely based on interpretation and subsequent manipulation of phenomena, then scientific and technological progress, as well as cultural richness, which is derived from the indispensable necessity of the noumena with regards to creative/artistic productions, would arguably be severely stunted and diluted because of the absence of practically legitimate insights derived from noumenal intuitions, in addition to visions of theoretically unlimited imaginations that ultimately might yield practical purposes, and quite possibly to significant degrees that life solely revolving upon phenomena might never construe.

Noumena

In looking over my notes, I was interested in the idea that the moral universe exists in the noumena--outside the realm of possible experience and those things that can be known empirically.  Within the boundaries of logical possibility and the noumena is reason.  It seems to me that at the intersection of the reason and our lived experience humans are able to synthesize our ideas and order them in line with a moral judgment, that is to say that while morality itself cannot be felt or truly experienced, one can orient herself towards this abstract concept in hopes that her phenomena reflect the noumena. While I'm not 100% sure I have all of the longitudes and latitudes of Kant's ideas in their appropriate places here (the illustration from Wednesday on the board was quite intricate) I feel as though there is something here onto which I can grasp. It is entirely possible that this construction of the moral is backwards, as Kant says at the onset of this chapter, "we desire to be told also what we want to know," even when there might be nothing to know at all (181).

Pure Categories

Much of Kant is incredibly confusing, and when it seems like an idea has been explained well enough, something gets confused again. After this week’s discussion, I thought that I had a clear enough understanding of what Kant was trying to explain. However, after rereading some passages to write a blog post, one passage in particular became convoluted for me. This post is merely to ask for clarification on his point. 

On page 265, under B305, Kant pure categories and their possibility for transcendental employment. He writes:

“Since, then, as pure categories merely, they are not to be employed empirically, and cannot be employed transcendentally, they cannot when separated from all sensibility, be employed in any manner whatsoever, that is, they cannot be applied to any ostensible object. They are the pure form of the employment of understanding in respect of objects in general, that is, of thought; but since they are merely its form, through them alone no object can be thought or determined.”

By this does he specifically mean that someone cannot consciously apply the categories to objects and that the application is something that happens without one realizing it? Or does he mean that the pure categories are the form of understanding, and because of it, form everything that is in experience? Here, I am unable to know if I have an answer or am even asking the right questions.

Closing Thoughts on Kant

What did Kant set out to do in his work? Essentially, the aim of Kant was to determine the conditions that led to various aspects of human thought and understanding. His method effectively built a bridge between the strict empiricist interpretation of human understanding and that of the strict rationalist. I feel that ultimately Kant achieved the building of a bridge between the two schools of thought and effectively mapped out the various forms/conditions that facilitate human understanding. In his own words his examination of the functions of the human mind have revealed that "this domain is an island, enclosed by nature itself with unalterable limits." (257). Thus, this statement calls to mind the circle diagrams that we have been drawing in class and offers a wonderful (and rare) visual image of what Kant has done. Essentially, he has revealed and explained the realm of and constraints of empirical reality. Establishing that knowledge comes from empirical sources, but, there are a priori conditions at work that must exist in such a way as to allow for our perception of empirical experience. Thus, Kant is quick to state that "the principles of pure understanding...contain nothing but what may be called the pure schema of possible experience." (258). It is clear that while we can think of these a priori conditions their objective truth is found only in their application to empirical perception. Meaning that concepts of the soul as immortal can be thought of (perhaps even in a regulatory manner) but can never be perceived as true for there is no empirical method to understand the conditions of "soul". While in the other hand the condition of space is such that without this condition there would be no concept of external objects, this concept we do have, thus the condition of space is applied to the empirical experience of objects.

Noumena as Limiting Factors

An interesting concept that Kant discussed in the “Phenomena and Noumena” section was that of noumena being a limiting concept. He states, “The concept of a noumenon is thus a merely limiting concept, the function of which is to curb the pretensions of sensibility” (272). I thought about this in the sense that noumena are logically possible, but not empirically possible. They are limiting because they put a boundary between what is logical and what is illogical. There is the difference between what is a stark contradiction, like a circular square, and a logical possibility, and this difference is the definition of noumena. There is also a difference between what exists in reality and what doesn’t. This concept is a limiting concept because it limits what is plausible for us to reasonably think and separates it from the contradictions.

            Before this paragraph, I was kind of thinking as noumena as a category that I could use to describe some thought or idea. However, with this passage and the different perspective it offers, I could think of it more as a constraining sense instead of a positive sense.

Kant Overall

            Reading the Transcendental Deduction (B) and the Phenomena and Noumena, I feel like I understand Kant’s thought a little bit better. It is still super strange and confusing, but at least with these two parts, I understand the basic points that he is trying to make.

            After these two sections specifically, I feel that Kant is just trying to categorize things and clarify the terms we use. I cannot recall a section where he was trying to prove, as he would call it, a phenomena or noumena; he just defines what things are and show us how to use them to categorize the thoughts and experiences that we encounter on a daily basis. Objects and thought were not things that had to be proven to exist like Descartes thought; they just needed to be used properly by know what they are. In that sense, Kant is a lot like Hobbes in the first half of Leviathan. He is just as tedious as clarifying every term that he uses to guarantee that we know what he means. His style helps the reader comprehend what he is saying, but at the same time, it is so deep that if you miss what he is saying, future parts of the book may seem confusing or vague.

Immanuel Kant

Experience and how you sense it are debated and explained in this piece regularly. Kant talks about possible experience and your actual experience as two things in one setion while causality and transedental condition remain on the outside. If we think of a storm. Rainy and loud with lightning flashing and thunder cracking. If we analyze that for a moment to realize how we can see these as experiences. Lightning is a seperate experience from the thunder because of the time inbetween. However you combine the two events using forms of intuitinon and categories of understanding. With all of this experience comes out. Experience essentially becomes the bases of knowlege.

Is Kant's description of space metaphysical?

If something that is metaphysical can be described as outside the limitation of human understanding or experience then it may be appropriate to designate Kant's idea of space as such.

Kant defines space as the foundation of our experiences in that in order to recognize the separation of sensations from one another and from oneself, space must already exist.  He states that space is a priori as we could not imagine a non-space, or even what a space actually may be, but in turn only the objects that occupy said space and their relationship with one another within this medium.

Kant then goes on to discuss space as a form of intuition.  In this regard space cannot be something that has been comprised of or caused by thought, as it is a natural entity existing in all individuals.  

Lastly Kant states that space is represented as an infinite quantity.  This further establishes the idea that space cannot be conceived as we cannot understand something that is infinite, but only try to understand it by our experiences of our physical and limited surroundings.

If space is something that cannot be observed, cannot be thought of or recognized in and of itself, and exists before we can even become conscious beings, then it seems to be a metaphysical entity, that like anything else that is metaphysical, is beyond our ability to define it accurately.

Kant and Math

One of the most fascinating areas within Kant’s perception of reality is his view on math. Although he believes that Geometry is an a priori science, on the subject of algebra, Kant writes, “We might, indeed, at first suppose that the proposition 7 + 5 = 12 is a merely analytic proposition, and follows by the principle of contradiction from the concept of a sum of 7 and 5. But if we look more closely we find that the concept of the sum of 7 and 5 contains nothing save the union of the two numbers into one, and in this no thought is being taken as to what the single number may be which combines both. The concept of 12 is by no means already thought in merely thinking this union of 7 and 5” (52-53). There algebra is a posteriori.

Kant’s argument relies on the assumption that no one would see the union of 7 and 5 as automatically being 12 in an a priori situation. However, I believe that it is possible to view this as a priori. I think that this is a situation where Kant is giving a subjective opinion. One that is not resolute and without valid contradictions.