Space of Base

In Kant's exposition on the nature of space, he defines space as an a priori template of infinite magnitude, in which the other significant non-physical attributes besides space itself that also possess an a priori nature are geometric shapes. However, these geometrical entities that exist outside of the human mind are arrived at synthetically, rather than in a purely analytic manner, like space itself. Through what is mostly an impenetrable fog of verbal convolution and and excessively multi-layered complexity, Kant arguably delivers an excellent point regarding why it is that geometric shapes are synthetic, a priori judgments. The essential point is that shapes, or structures corresponding to exact geometrical laws, must first be apprehended with the impulsion to understand their overarching and exact mathematical foundations, and to perhaps actually apply the shapes for a technical, or intelligent use of some sort. That is to say that a precise understanding of such shapes, let alone application, could very well be deemed unnecessary by a certain society or individual, and they may never even envision what a perfected form of shapes would look like in their mind. Space alone, on the other hand, is clearly conceived of by everyone regardless of sensory handicaps like blindness or deafness, and it possesses a supreme application of the highest order in terms of how people experience the entirety of their lives in accordance to not only the vacuous space that separates objects, but how displacement or adjustment of objects effect their existence insofar as newly occupied space takes on new properties, which are in turn configured by the properties of the object(s) that now define space. Even then, knowing the exact mathematical properties of geometric shapes could theoretically never spell the difference between life and death, or serve any significant practical purpose—perhaps.

Now supposing one possessed a desire to know geometric shapes to the point of mathematical perfection, it would conceivably be necessary for them to utilize means of systematic and scientifically rigorous measurement to determine that shapes have specific angular measures that are equal when the sides are also equal, and that deviation from such exact measurements will result in a lack of cohesion, and therefore a deficit in optimal application, whether that be for engineering purposes or otherwise. Such measurements and scientific work therefore entail synthetic activity (i.e., measuring and going about the process of determining the a priori aspects of geometric shapes), rather than a merely analytic judgment that does require a means of discovery or verification that certain concepts which appear in the mind are indeed not dependent on human consciousness to exist. On the contrary, space does not require measurements and precise calculation, or a scientific method of any kind to judge that space in fact exists. It is recognized as an obvious and inherent superstructure of existence that could only be systematically doubted, or approached in a calculating sense if one were to question whether or not they are in a machine or hallucination (as extreme examples meant to elucidate) insofar as all they perceive is an illusory product of a higher or invisible intelligence, or fabrication brought upon by a substance(s) or enigmatic technology unbeknownst to the person undergoing the ridiculously overblown deception that comprises existence on Earth.

Moreover, space simply does not require synthetic action in order for it be perceived as the a priori template in which all objects and physical events are inextricably bound. It is rather automatically experienced as a prerequisite for existence (even if you're trapped; you're still in space), to the extent that all that ever happens occurs within space, or interactively with any and all objects that happened to be generated within the framework of space. All objects, or physical components of space, are subject to dissolution en route to conveying portals that enable an infinite possibility of new objects to enter, combine, and take action in a multiplicity of ways, but always to the degree that the same space is eternal in its nature, as well as ability for expansion. Geometrical shapes do not possess this feature though; for shapes are manipulated and objects come to be in a manner tantamount to instantiating the existence of the shapes by the warping of, or intrinsic operations within the infinite and shapeless, formless entity (albeit proto-non-entity, in a complementary sense) that space is.

One of the most interesting discussions I feel we’ve had on Kant so far has been on his idea of unity. I was particularly interested in the suggestion that we, humans, unify at the expense of reality and our experience is a perversion of the given. I find Kant’s suggestion that we create unity because we are one, in spite of the fact that pure unity doesn’t actually exist. I love the image of a human being taking in the manifold before her through senses and thoughts and then having it come out on the other side (or in her mind) as a unified perceptive experience.  This way of experiencing things seems to be a natural reflex and our discussion reminded me of the same idea as relates to history.  

In Dr. Pete Kuryla’s class a few weeks ago he drew a circle on the board which represented the past, then he drew a small dot in the center of the circle which represented history.  This idea of synthesizing  the manifold, a.) for the sake of simplicity and b.) because we can’t possibly take it all in, seems to be very true to how humans work in the world.  I can feel better about this when I realize that, most of all, this represents a space into which we can grow. 

Kant on Space

Space is one of the more interesting a priori ideas that Kant examines. His view of space is different from how I viewed the concept of space. Space, for me, found itself in the manifestation of the concept of distance and measurement. For Kant space is not like this at all. Space is simply seen by Kant as a condition that allows for all external empirical perception to occur. Space is made apparent to us through things that reside within it, or rather, because we can perceive things outside ourselves that necessarily need to have space to be perceived. Kant states that space is an, "a priori representation, which necessarily underlines outer appearances" (Kant 68). Essentially, space is a priori due to the fact that it is an entity that cannot be empirically evaluated. For example, Kant says that, "We can never represent to ourselves the absence of space, though we can quite well think it as empty of objects" (Kant 68). Thus, while we can imagine empty "space" we cannot imagine external objects as existing in a state without space. Thus, space to Kant is a thing that enables the perception of all external objects, and it is a priori due to the fact that we cannot empirically understand its existence, and yet we would be utterly unable to distinguish external objects without it.

Kant's Line Analogy

In our reading of Kant so far, I have been most interested in his discussion of time. Time has always seemed kind of like a fluid, abstract entity to me, despite its very concrete presence in our lives. I have also never thought to connect it to space, and how the two are the conditions under which reality occurs. The most illuminating passage for me is when Kant makes the analogy of the line: “We represent the time-sequence by a line progressing to infinity, in which the manifold constitutes a series of one-dimension only; and we reason from the properties of this line to all the properties of time, with this one exception, that while the parts of the line are simultaneous, the parts of time are always successive” (77). It is true that we can only be present in one moment at a time, but it is also true that all of the other moments that haven’t happened yet and that have happened in the past are just as present in the spectrum of time. These moments, along with space, are the conditions under which experience occurs.

            Also in that paragraph, Kant asserts that time is still an intuition. The line example works so well because it is rather intuitive and doesn’t take a lot of unpacking. We can all intuit the properties and significance of a line. So, despite how “this inner intuition yields no shape,” I think the analogy of the line has augmented my understanding of Kant’s point as a whole (77). 

Critque of Pure Reason

To understand Kant's Critique of Pure Reason, one must first understand the distinction Kant makes between a few sets of parameters: a priori and a posteriori truths, analytic and synthetic judgements, and a clear explanation of transcendental conditions. His critique hinges upon these distinctions and sets him apart from previous philosophers, namely David Hume.

A priori truths do not require any experience to be true. Conditions including space, time, and cause exist outside of human experience and are a priori. What is important here is that a priori truth is completely independent of all experience, not just a particular experience. For example, how does one know a house will fall to the ground if its supports are taken away? It must be because one has experienced other objects behaving the same way. One needs not to have previously experienced a house falling over to know that it will with no supports. This kind of knowledge is a posteriori because it only exists after experience. This is Kant's first distinction.

The division between analytic and synthetic judgements is in many respects more difficult a concept. I will attempt to explain them as clearly as possible. An analytic judgement takes one concept and finds truth in the "unpacking" of that one concept via a proper definition of the concept. For example, saying that men are humans is an analytic statement that simply is true because the definitions of our terms "men" and "human". Accordingly, saying that men are not women is also an analytic statement. Synthetic judgements arise when one starts to make claims that require a posteriori knowledge to back up. Saying, for example, that all men are assholes requires the synthesis of the terms "men" and "asshole".

Finally there is the exploration into the transcendental argument, Kant's most profound discovery. Refuting Hume's strong, empiricist conclusions regarding the existence of truth, Kant found a multitude of conditions for experience that absolutely can not be experienced themselves. These conditions therefore must exist outside of experience, destroying Hume's account of empiricism. Space, time, causality and the rest of the transcendental conditions are simply the wire framework around which we construct our reality.

Kan't Method

            Kant’s method so far has been one of the clearest methods that we have gone through so far. His method lays out exactly what he is thinking in a fluid way. If you have a question about a term, he answers it in the following sentence. The only other philosopher we read that was anywhere close to this was Hobbes in Leviathan, but his method was not as clear.

            For a book that is so clear and so planned and so well laid-out, I have had the hardest time understanding this text. While reading, I see his definitions, I even see some of his broader ideas like a priori, but I still feel like I miss so much of what he is saying. All the parts are there, but sometimes the connections seem hazy to me. This could be due to the fact that I have to fully understand each idea to fully understand the next or the connections could not be there. At this point, his reasoning and logic seems fairly clear enough, so hidden somewhere in this text is probably the connecting thread that I am missing. Also, skipping around in the book may be leaving out some parts of the connection, but even then he is thorough enough in each individual part that you can understand what happened before.

            Kant has so far been one of my favorite modern philosopher and am eager to read more and so try to follow his train of thought.

Hume Burn the Books!

For this post im mainl going to be focussing on his wrap up of the enquiry on page 114. Throughout this piece Hume explains comfotably his stance and how he approaches life. In the first part he seperates reasonings between moral and a physical type. He uses this to create a field of understanding and making it comfortable to read, probably so that this would be more popular than his previous work witht the population. His tone creates a feeling that its okay to be unsure and question things on the middle ground. As long as you are not ignorant your good in humes 'book'. Im going to fast forward now to the quote, “If we take in our hand any volume; of divinity or school metaphysics, for instance; let us ask, Does it contain any abstract reasoning concerning quantity or number? No. Does it contain any experimental reasoning concerning matter of fact and existence? No. Commit it then to the flames: For it can contain nothing but sophistry and illusion.”(114). This in my opinion discredits his previous feeling of its okay to be on the middle ground. As his comfotable conversation turns into a drastic call to arms. He becomes so critical of metaphysics and all that it stands for. This makes Hume unreliable and hard to believe or follow. In an almost convoluted fashion he switches his tone. I really liked his quote here though "Be a philosopher; but amidst all your philosophy, be still a man"(4).

Hume on Impressions and Ideas

When reading David Hume's An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, his views of thoughts or ideas and impressions stood out to me the most. According to Hume, impressions are lively and vivid perceptions while ideas come from memory (memory being our imagination), which are less lively and vivid. Impressions are something that we comprehend, as he states "all our more lively perceptions, when we hear or see, or feel, or love, or hate, or desire, or will." So in other words, ideas are based of of our own impressions. One example is the thought of seeing red when feeling anger. The feeling of anger is an impression because it is something we witness. So when we have the memory of anger, we think of the color red because its an idea based off our impression.

First Thoughts on Kant

"Human reason has this peculiar fate that in one species of its knowledge it is burdened by questions which, as prescribed by the very nature of reason itself, it is not able to ignore, but which, as transcending all its powers, it is also not able to answer." Initially, reading this made me think reading the this book would be vain. But no philosophy has found an absolute and definitive answer to philosophy; that is not its purpose. It appears that Kant is demarcating boundaries for the practice of philosophy?
When Kant writes, "we have no knowledge antecedent to experience, and with experience all our knowledge begins." Yet, there is universal truth that is more pure and exist independent of reason. These I believe are certain principles such as in math (the angles of a triangle adding up to 180 degrees). Kant calls this a priori. Yet, he does not try and define this universality, unlike many other philosophers. I think that this approach is brilliant even though I am still very new to understanding it. If he is correct in this matter it seems that a priori and a posteriori knowledge would be a system that would save many philosophers from contemplating things that do not abide by this system, things that exist beyond the foundations of Kant's critique. Kant writes, "it is possible to show that pure a priori principles are indispensable for the possibility of experience, and so to prove their existence a priori." The root of a priori knowledge still is not clear.

Hume and Newton

         When reading Hume’s An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, what immediately jumped out at me was the way in which Hume used Isaac Newton to introduce his argument. I enjoyed reading about the origin of his reasoning. I refer specifically to the section where Hume writes, “Astronomers had long contented themselves with proving, from the phenomena, the true motions, order, and magnitude of the heavenly bodies: Till a philosopher, at last, arose, who seems, from the happiest reasoning, to have also determined the laws and forces, by which the revolutions of the planets are governed and directed. The like has been performed with regard to other parts of nature. And there is no reason to despair of equal success in our enquiries concerning the mental powers and economy, if prosecuted with equal capacity and caution” (Hume 8).

         Hume’s belief that the scientific method can be used for the mind in the same way that Newton utilized it is fascinating. Most of the other philosophers we have studied do not specify their inspiration for writing their texts. I also found it interesting how Hume believed that there might be a correlation between progresses made in sciences to progress made with human understanding. Keeping this inspiration in mind made reading Hume’s text all the more interesting.

Hume-Ness for the Win

In the last chapter of An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Hume emphasizes how radical skepticism taken to an extreme and  unmitigated degree would be ridiculous on account of how terribly damaging it would be to practical aspects of life. He expresses the madness of such skepticism by bringing Pyrrhonic skepticism to light, which argues that for every argument there potentially exists an infinite amount of counterarguments, and therefore no such thing as absolute truth and knowledge can be experienced by people with complete certainty. As far as adherence to radical skepticism is concerned, if people were to live in accordance to the notion that absolutely nothing can be proved certain, and that our senses are utterly unreliable and detached from truth, then people would go about their lives doing anything imaginable at any time and under any circumstances, and with abject disregard for unpleasant consequences, since everything is equally fake and illusory, at least according to the precepts of Pyrrhonism.
However, supposing that people maintain their adamant and overarching incentive to be productive and act in ways that perpetuate the preservation of humanity, while also making life more enjoyable and comfortable, skepticism taken to a radical extreme has no place in the spheres of life that are dedicated to the activities of advancing scientific understanding, as well as the evolution of systems of morality, politics, and culture in general. In order for skepticism to be effective, it must not exceed or take firm root in its extreme form; for that would more than likely severely hinder the evolution of humanity's understanding of nature, and the development of technology and scientific knowledge capable of profoundly enhancing quality of life, along with the capacity to master negative aspects of nature that pose a threat to individual health, and humanity's preservation. Instead, rational degrees of skepticism will ideally be relegated to domains of life consistent with branches of science and practical knowledge that deal with maximizing empirical understanding, which translate into lasting aims that serve clear benefits for the betterment of life and humanity.
Although Hume does not make this explicit, his elaboration on the role of the application of probability-based reasoning for acquiring beliefs or conclusions--in accordance to causally-based patterns and sequences of events--reinforces the necessity to practice skepticism in a rational and productive manner that leads to noteworthy results. Namely, the proper application of probability-based reasoning consists of determining that a deviation in an effect vis-a-vis the typical effect, which follows a typical cause, is a matter of a systemic error related to specific parts, or a logically expressible phenomenon or alteration of some sort, whether that be pathological or adaptive, which causes the change in the effect. That is opposed to the absurd theory paralleling radical skepticism, which would be that such changes occur as a result of some spontaneous and inexplicable occurrence, false perception, or perhaps even an hallucination on a mass-scale as to how the chain of causality relevant to the connected events was played out before the deviation in the effect, or effects, took place. 
Moreover, probability-based reasoning practiced efficiently does not involve transferring the past in its exact form to the present moment, as if what happened before absolutely must happen always insofar as the exact same moment continues in accordance to the same essences that manifest in merely different forms. Yet it is not the case that time operates in a circular fashion conformable to exact essences. It is instead a linear process in which essences are constantly prone to change, whereby one or many events must be taken into full account with regards to readily observable changes, or constant recurrences that amount to obvious patterns. Otherwise, if the maxim were confided in that all causality-defined occurrences from the past were subject to exact translation at any given moment in the future in which the same chain of events takes place, and with a particular effect or effects being the end result, then radical skepticism would conceivably be taking place to a preposterous level prone to substantially stunt progress, while additionally undermining an intelligible interpretation of nature designed to yield positive outcomes, or new and valuable insights. Such application of probability-based reasoning lends ample credence to the the demand for skepticism to maintain boundaries which make it useful in the realm of humanity's practical utility, so to speak, as it relates to the qualitative and scientific enhancement of life (viz., culture and leisure, etc., regarding the former; medical and technological advance, etc., regarding the latter).

Peculiar Situations

In our discussion on Wednesday we spoke about how Kant sees the Peculiar Situation that humans find ourselves in whereby we possess faculty that wants to know what it cannot know. I find this interesting because it suggests that at some point our desire for knowledge becomes futile or purely recreational.  In addition it made me consider this pure, a priori, knowledge that seems to exist as something like an essence or Truth with which humans can connect. This idea of knowledge as an essence of sorts seems to make the most sense when I consider Kant's assertion that synthetic a priori knowledge is possible.  The example of 5 + 7 = 12 forces me to consider how this judgement isn't, in fact, analytic--an identity statement in which both 5 and 7 are contained within 12.  It's a real quandary, but I like where Kant is going, and I'm excited to delve deeper into his Critique of Pure Reason.

Kant's A Priori and Plato

Like we talked about in class, defining, understanding, and memorizing Kant’s terminology is an integral part of even beginning to understand his philosophy. While reading the introduction, I thought I had a decent grasp on what a priori judgments are, but actually coming up with examples of knowledge that fits the description a priori is not an easy task. There were two examples in the introduction that made my understanding a bit clearer. The first regards mathematics: “Mathematics gives us a shining example of how far, independently of experience, we can progress in a priori knowledge.  It does, indeed, occupy itself with objects and with knowledge solely in so far as they allow of being exhibited in intuition” (46-47). This explanation and its inclusion of intuition sheds some light on how a priori knowledge can exist and what it entails. I can have an intuition without any experience, and it is still a real and tangible judgment.

Also, in that same paragraph, Kant articulates a fault in Plato’s philosophy that made me understand a priori a little better. He states: “It was thus that Plato left the world of the senses, as setting too narrow limits to the understanding, and ventured out beyond it on the wings of the ideas, in the empty space of the pure understanding. He did not observe that with all his efforts he made no advance—meeting no resistance that might, as it were, serve as a support upon which he could take a stand” (47). This made me think of Plato’s forms and whether or not they are known a priori. In a sense, they are separate from experience. However, one must study and contemplate the forms and go through education and training to reach a real understanding of the forms, which sounds like experience to me. I’m not sure if a priori can even be applied to abstract, metaphysical subjects like this, and if so, how. Either way, it seems that Kant is criticizing Plato’s venture into the “empty space of the pure understanding.” I’m sure that as we analyze Kant more and consider different examples, the particularities of a priori will become more clear. 

Is "A Priori" Actually Possible?

            A priori knowledge sounds like an awesome idea conceptually; some things are out there that we just know. A triangle is a shape. A bachelor is a man. These kind of definitive concepts would be a great foundation for things, but is this all actually a priori knowledge? All of these that seem to be a priori, but they don’t seem to help with the furthering of knowledge. From what I know now, analytic a priori knowledge are just categorization. A triangle is a shape tells us nothing of a triangle; it just says what category of stuff a triangle is.

            But how a priori is that knowledge that we think is a priori? Before there were humans, were triangles shapes? Were there even triangles? Was the word “triangle” just a word that humans assigned to three sided figures? Was “bachelor” the word that we applied to single men?  Like I said earlier, a priori sounds like a great concept that would help greatly in philosophizing, but how true is it? I am very interested to see what Kant goes with a priori and synthetic judgments and how he shows they are possible.

Hume's Enquiry

In Hume's "Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding", we are introduced to (perhaps reminded of, but in new terms) the concept that there are two very distinct mental processes: impressions and thoughts or ideas. Impressions occur through experience; for example, we have the impression of pain when we try to pick up an ember from a fire, and the impression of red occurs when we see the blistering skin afterward. Impressions occur when something in the natural world impresses upon us, regardless of how we think or feel about that something. We hardly have any control over the impression itself, but our thoughts about the impression are indeed our own. With this in mind, all of our thoughts must originate from some impression or multiple impressions, for we can not think about something that has not made an impression upon us. Even when we invent mythical and fantastical worlds and beings that seem to defy any conventional knowledge, when broken down they are all just combinations of things we have already had impressions of from the natural world. With this understanding, we can move on to our discussion of causality.

Using Hume's billiards example, how do we know that when one billiard ball strikes another with enough force, the second will move? We don't know this a priori. There's no truth separate from experience that tells us that second ball with move when struck. We know it will only because we have seen it happen before, or seen something similar. We need not have seen billiard balls move in this way, any objects will suffice. Furthermore, the movement of one billiard ball certainly does not imply the movement of any others. For example, suppose we have ball A moving across the table with ball B at rest. We can't say that ball B will begin to move because ball A is in motion because there is no requirement that ball B move when ball A does. If both balls were moving across the table, we could notice the appearance of ball A sending ball B into motion, but there's something happening in between ball A's motion and ball B's rest that, according to Hume, we can not rightly call a "cause".

Here I have to disagree with Hume. He is so spot-on about so much, but his theory of constant conjunction vs. necessary connexion seems misguided. Yes, humans are certainly conditioned by seeing things in conjunction, but there are things that are necessarily connected in nature that are not just observations of conjunction. Water molecules, for example, are a combination of two hydrogen atoms and one oxygen atom. Nature can not change the rules here. Adding or subtracting atoms will alter the molecule, making it something other than H2O. This is a necessary connexion: two parts hydrogen and one part oxygen results in water, not just an observed conjunction.

What Can and Kant Be Done

While reading the introduction to Kant's Critique of Pure one of the first thoughts that entered my mind was what was his aim, or rather, what would this work seek to explore. Essentially, Kant is going to attempt to reconcile the ideas of knowledge through experience alone (empiricism) and the thought that human understanding can come from things that are not empirically experienced (rationalism). Kant states early on in the work that he believes, "There can be no doubt that all our knowledge begins with experience" (Kant 41). From this statement it is clear to see that Kant believes that knowledge and experience are linked. However, he doesn't believe that experience is the end all of knowing. In fact, he believes that there are other forms of thought that occur over and above empirical knowing. His thoughts about this revolve around the analytic and synthetic "a priori". Essentially, a priori is the concept of knowledge that comes before particular experience or experience as a whole. An example of analytical a priori seem to revolve around definitions, such as the statement "all single men are bachelors". This is known to be true due to the fact that we have the analytical ability to know that single men are bachelors and thus can apply this as a general truth for the opposite (no single men are bachelors) makes little since. Now, synthetic a priori are different. These occur outside empirical thought and an example of this is the idea of "causality". Kant believes that causality is essential to forming experience. For, if we didn't think of a concept of causality there would be no way to garnish experience from events that happen around us. Causality acts as a middle man between an event and our empirical knowledge of the event. If we had no middleman, no way to frame empirical occurrences then gaining knowledge from experienced would prove convoluted as would whatever event happened that was unable to be framed within reason.

Hume

Hume suggests that the mind has an incredibly limited understanding, if any understanding at all, of the workings of nature.  In this light, we are essentially powerless in regards to the workings of nature .  He supports this idea with the problem of induction, that the future actions of certain products cannot be determined by past experiences, as these experiences determine the probability of a certain event, but cannot make a absolute determination as to whether or not an event will occur.  Despite this he does not advocate the abolishment of practical behavior, as practical behavior is necessary for survival regardless of the truth behind the action.  In this regard the problem of induction has no consequence over those who simple act without much thought, but for those who require reason behind their action, the problem of induction becomes a hindrance.

It is from this line of thought that Hume advocates the abolishment of the study of and belief in metaphysics.

He makes the statement that one cannot dream of something without first having experienced it.  To Hume all thought is a product of experience, so how can we determine anything about what is outside of our experience? As soon as something metaphysical becomes experienced, it is no longer metaphysical, as it has subjected itself to the physical means by which a human needs in order to have an experience.

Locke

Locke does not understand the nature of humankind—some sentences contradict themselves. Particularly when he writes, “ the damnnified person has this power of appropriating to himself the goods or service of the offender, by right of self-preservation, as every man has a power to punish the crime, to prevent its being committed again, by the right he has of preserving all mankind. Self preservation seems here to be a restraint of power. But locke claims that men have the right to implement power to justify a disruption of rights the he claims are inherent: “no one ought to harm another in his life, health, liberty, or possessions: for men being all the workmanship of one omnipotent, and infinitely wise maker; all the servants

The ephemeral and exhaustive truth of power gives it value and seems to drive men in the first place; to ‘preserve’ it would only mean to watch humankind decay. In order to preserve, power must be exercised. Hobbes makes the mistake that Nietzsche points out when he writes, “A living thing seeks above all to discharge its strength—life itself is will to power; self preservation is only one of the indirect and most frequent results” (Nietzsche 211). It would be a mistake to make the assumption that virtue, intelligence, and morality is parceled out equally at birth. Locke seems to think so. Equality is a necessary illusion to maintain and promote a society, a civilization. If a society is to progress, even the most base must feel that they are discharging their power, so to say, in a meaningful way because that is the aim of all men. Yet, society must be controlled as Locke writes, “God hath certainly appointed government to restrain the partiality and violence of men.” but only because society is a greater force Then, virtues of “compassion” and “empathy” are still rooted in power, and maybe morality? Because without a society there is no gradation and no understanding of “individual.”

Hobbes

For Hobbes, his ideas of sensory imagination caught my attention specifically in chapter III. He writes, “a man can have no thought representing anything not subject to sense” (Hobbes 15). Pertaining to religion, this claim has influence over me. When imagining God, the most common thing seems to be to personify. We furthermore describe him with sensory perception. Hobbes claims that this is a limitation because our sensory perceptions are essentially limitations thus making us finite in comparison to something infinite, something that transcends and surpasses the sensory perceptions of the human mind. God in his actual nature cannot be comprehended through a human and finite capacity.  Yet, in chapter XII Of Religion, Hobbes claims that men “by their own meditation arrive to the acknowledgement of one infinite, omnipotent, and eternal God, choose rather to confess he is incomprehensible, and above their understanding…” (Hobbes 65). I am reminded By Kierkengaard’s infinite resignation. It is not possible to know God completely, but even in our finiteness, we can give reverence to this omnipotent and infinite God because according to Hobbes, “ God is kind of all the earth” (71). This led me to questions of how one then pays tribute to God while being finite, limited to sensory perception. Through art?If arts goal is to imitate nature then is it imitating God being that he is omnipotent?

Social Contracts and Slavery

One of the main ways that I believe Rousseau separates himself from the Locke and Hobbes is his distain for the social contract. Locke and Hobbes sort of seem to hold the contract among men. Rousseau, however, believes that it is an evil much like the rest of society. He may see certain aspects of life much like Hobbes, but this separate seems to be a strong one. Rousseau states on page 68, right before the end of Part One of the Discourse on Inequality, that “Without needlessly prolonging these details, anyone should see that, since the bonds of servitude are formed merely from the mutual dependence of men and the reciprocal needs that unite them, it is impossible to enslave a man without having first put him in the position of being incapable of doing without another. This being a situation that did not exist in the state of nature, it leaves each person free of the yoke, and renders pointless the law of the strongest.”

My question for the class, which I wish we could have theorized about more, is Rousseau arguing that the desire for power Hobbes argues all men have along with the contract between men comes with a propensity to put others in bonds? Is he merely stating that it has seemed the natural course of history has been for contracts among men to eventually escalate into something that resembles the slavery of others? Or is he saying neither of these things but something completely different?

Rousseau and American Political Discourse

In reading "Part tTwo" of Rousseau's Discourse on the Origin of Inequality I was struck by how applicable his work is to contemporary American discourse on issues of politics and income inequality.  In his American History (post 1865) course, Dr. Pete Kuryla does lots of work disassembling and inspecting the American Dream Myth.  This refers to the idea that if a citizen works hard enough, he or she will be met with success in the land of the free, and if an individual fails, it is due to some lack of virtue or work ethic on his or her part. This is an argument that we hear often in our discourse as relates to women's rights, the rights of racial and ethnic minorities, incarcerated persons, those living in poverty, etc... As a society we reject the notions that larger systems are at play which keep those on top and at the bottom static, and we embrace Horatio Alger underdog stories in lieu of encountering reality.  This idea makes it impossible to critique the "self-made" man (who is literally most often a man) and it encourages people who occupy oppressed statuses to play at a game which is rigged for their demise.
All that is to say I think that Rousseau cuts right at the joints of this discourse in his opening paragraph of "Part Two" and, most specifically, when he states "a rich man, pressed by necessity, finally conceived the most thought-out project that ever entered the human mind" (79).  How is one to subvert the masses of common people and paupers as they "perish or suffer from need of what you have in excess" (78)? You make them believe that they don't deserve what you have in the first place. As Rousseau would put it, the humans on top can subvert those below by calling for a fight which "repulses common enemies, and maintains us in an eternal concord" (79).  For lack of a better phrase, with friends like that, who needs enemies?

Too true

The Appendix of Discourse on Inequality contains the most striking remarks of the entire essay. Roughly halfway through, Rousseau points out how workers in the field of agriculture would find themselves being monetarily rewarded within the spectrum of the poorest of mankind, and that such a happening would result from the fact that agricultural productivity is among the most universally useful activities from which mankind benefits. As opposed to agricultural production, Rousseau claims that those who produce mechanical and liberal works of art would benefit highly, or at least vastly more than farmers and those who create art, or innovate in ways that could be socially important on a universal level and, perhaps, revolutionary on account of practicality.
This unfortunate result would be borne of the superfluous decadence of a society in which the rulers, or most powerful, benefit from the population living overindulgent lives of distraction and physical gratification. Such an array of superfluities would include letters and commerce at-large, whereby industry flourishes even further on account of people's high-level consumption of luxurious items in general, books, and various items and services that are not essential to survival. As an amendment to the earlier remarks regarding agriculture, the farmers would not necessarily be poor, but the price of produce itself would be "proportionate to the abilities of the poorest of mankind," whereby the poorest would be able to obtain produce on a bare minimum level for survival. On account of such a scenario, the lucrativeness of agriculture would decrease in a manner that would dissuade most people from seriously pursuing it. Instead, people would be more inclined to produce creative or commercial art that is not essential, but highly valued by a conceivably depraved population that has become excessively steeped in luxury and base superficiality.
The primary reason that Rousseau's remarks on these matters stands out so prominently is due to the current cultural and socioeconomic state of America. Our society has certainly manifested Rousseau's words pertaining to the diminishing of agricultural allure from a professional level, and America highly values arts and forms of entertainment such as movies, sporting events, etc., that are profoundly superfluous and devoid of enlightening, truthful, and revolutionary insights that could undermine the current economic and political establishment. He further adds that these excesses lead to both the enrichment and ruination of nations. That is, while certain industries laugh all the way to the bank and prosper, the people are in fact not generally reaching their maximum potential as human beings. Rather, they are economically exploited far more than built up; for being stifled by materialism and saturation with media and luxuries expands and maintains the power and wealth of those in charge of the various industries. Rousseau's closing remark, "From this we may learn what to think of the real advantages of industry and the actual effects of its progress," echoes far too resoundingly with the socioeconomic state of America, insofar as progress certainly does seem limited almost entirely to very few people who are in control of industries that primarily exploit and take advantage of people, rather than promote the overall betterment of the lives of citizens that have made their prosperity possible just as much, if not more, than their own cleverness or industriousness.