In the last chapter of An Enquiry Concerning Human Understanding, Hume emphasizes how radical skepticism taken to an extreme and unmitigated degree would be ridiculous on account of how terribly damaging it would be to practical aspects of life. He expresses the madness of such skepticism by bringing Pyrrhonic skepticism to light, which argues that for every argument there potentially exists an infinite amount of counterarguments, and therefore no such thing as absolute truth and knowledge can be experienced by people with complete certainty. As far as adherence to radical skepticism is concerned, if people were to live in accordance to the notion that absolutely nothing can be proved certain, and that our senses are utterly unreliable and detached from truth, then people would go about their lives doing anything imaginable at any time and under any circumstances, and with abject disregard for unpleasant consequences, since everything is equally fake and illusory, at least according to the precepts of Pyrrhonism.
However, supposing that people maintain their adamant and overarching incentive to be productive and act in ways that perpetuate the preservation of humanity, while also making life more enjoyable and comfortable, skepticism taken to a radical extreme has no place in the spheres of life that are dedicated to the activities of advancing scientific understanding, as well as the evolution of systems of morality, politics, and culture in general. In order for skepticism to be effective, it must not exceed or take firm root in its extreme form; for that would more than likely severely hinder the evolution of humanity's understanding of nature, and the development of technology and scientific knowledge capable of profoundly enhancing quality of life, along with the capacity to master negative aspects of nature that pose a threat to individual health, and humanity's preservation. Instead, rational degrees of skepticism will ideally be relegated to domains of life consistent with branches of science and practical knowledge that deal with maximizing empirical understanding, which translate into lasting aims that serve clear benefits for the betterment of life and humanity.
Although Hume does not make this explicit, his elaboration on the role of the application of probability-based reasoning for acquiring beliefs or conclusions--in accordance to causally-based patterns and sequences of events--reinforces the necessity to practice skepticism in a rational and productive manner that leads to noteworthy results. Namely, the proper application of probability-based reasoning consists of determining that a deviation in an effect vis-a-vis the typical effect, which follows a typical cause, is a matter of a systemic error related to specific parts, or a logically expressible phenomenon or alteration of some sort, whether that be pathological or adaptive, which causes the change in the effect. That is opposed to the absurd theory paralleling radical skepticism, which would be that such changes occur as a result of some spontaneous and inexplicable occurrence, false perception, or perhaps even an hallucination on a mass-scale as to how the chain of causality relevant to the connected events was played out before the deviation in the effect, or effects, took place.
Moreover, probability-based reasoning practiced efficiently does not involve transferring the past in its exact form to the present moment, as if what happened before absolutely must happen always insofar as the exact same moment continues in accordance to the same essences that manifest in merely different forms. Yet it is not the case that time operates in a circular fashion conformable to exact essences. It is instead a linear process in which essences are constantly prone to change, whereby one or many events must be taken into full account with regards to readily observable changes, or constant recurrences that amount to obvious patterns. Otherwise, if the maxim were confided in that all causality-defined occurrences from the past were subject to exact translation at any given moment in the future in which the same chain of events takes place, and with a particular effect or effects being the end result, then radical skepticism would conceivably be taking place to a preposterous level prone to substantially stunt progress, while additionally undermining an intelligible interpretation of nature designed to yield positive outcomes, or new and valuable insights. Such application of probability-based reasoning lends ample credence to the the demand for skepticism to maintain boundaries which make it useful in the realm of humanity's practical utility, so to speak, as it relates to the qualitative and scientific enhancement of life (viz., culture and leisure, etc., regarding the former; medical and technological advance, etc., regarding the latter).
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